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Standards and Practices
for Judging the Quality
of Scientiﬁc Work
The project on Scientific Knowledge and
Public Policy (SKAPP) examines the nature
of science and the ways in which it is used
and misused in government decision making
and legal proceedings. Last year, SKAPP
commissioned papers to address the question
“Should scientific work conducted for pur-
poses of advocacy before regulatory agencies
or courts be judged by the same standards as
science conducted for other purposes?”
(SKAPP 2006). This article is adapted from
one of those papers.
Science is a social enterprise, and scientiﬁc
work tends to be accepted by the community
when it has been confirmed. Crucially,
experimental and theoretical results must be
reproduced by others within the science com-
munity and the validity of the work estab-
lished by replication (Wikipedia 2007a).
However, such replication can take years, and
what constitutes replication in a given case
may also be disputable. Consequently, a vari-
ety of standards and practices have been
established over the years for assessing the
quality of scientific work (Barrow and
Conrad 2006). These standards and practices
apply to both “testing” (activities conducted
pursuant to protocols, prescribed by regulatory
agencies, that specify the content and charac-
teristics of studies to be conducted to meet
regulatory requirements, e.g., a standard
bioassay for carcinogenesis) and “research”
(studies that are hypothesis driven, addressing
broad methodologic or mechanistic ques-
tions, e.g., the biologic activity of chemicals
on the environment).
Both government and the scientiﬁc com-
munity outside of government have played
independent but reinforcing roles in develop-
ing and propagating these standards and prac-
tices. The private sector is actually driving
implementation of several relatively newer
practices, in part to address concerns about
the credibility of industry-funded science. In
general, the regulatory implementations of
these concepts impose additional require-
ments well beyond those conventionally
imposed outside of the regulatory context.
These government requirements promote a
high degree of reliability. As explained below,
the cumulative result of their applicability is
that science conducted for regulatory purposes
in many cases is actually likely to be more reli-
able than science conducted outside the regu-
latory arena. This is not to argue that the
latter should be required to comply with these
government requirements to any greater
extent than it already is, but only to emphasize
that science conducted pursuant to them is
relatively more reliable as a result.
Information Quality Act. The Information
Quality Act (IQA 2000) governs the quality of
information that federal agencies disseminate.
The IQA required the Ofﬁce of Management
and Budget (OMB) to issue an initial set of
implementing guidelines (OMB 2002). Each
federal agency then issued its guidelines apply-
ing the OMB guidelines to its particular cir-
cumstances [e.g., U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) 2002a].
It is important to note that the IQA
applies not only to information that agencies
generate themselves but also to information
developed by nongovernment parties, to the
extent the government “disseminates” it,
either by adopting or endorsing it as its own
view or by relying on it to make a decision.
[Information prepared for administrative
adjudications is exempt from IQA guidelines,
but agencies construe this exemption narrowly
(U.S. EPA 2002a).] Thus, to the extent that
businesses, universities, or other private enti-
ties conduct research or testing and the results
come into the possession of an agency such as
the U.S. EPA, the results cannot form a basis
of the agency’s decision without becoming
subject to IQA requirements. And those
requirements are most precise and demanding
in the area of scientiﬁc information.
OMB’s guidelines (OMB 2002) prescribe
fairly detailed standards for “objectivity.” As a
general matter, information must be accurate,
reliable, and unbiased. Scientiﬁc information
must be generated using sound research
methods. The sources of the information
must be disclosed and data should be docu-
mented. Scientific information must be
accompanied by supporting data and models.
“Influential” scientific information must be
sufﬁciently transparent to be reproduced sub-
ject to several caveats. (“Inﬂuential” informa-
tion is that which an agency “reasonably can
determine will have or does have a clear and
substantial impact on important public poli-
cies or private sector decisions.”) Influential
information regarding risks to health, safety,
or the environment must also be based on
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supporting studies conducted in accordance
with sound and objective scientiﬁc practices;
and . . . data collected by accepted methods or
best available methods,” and must disclose
significant uncertainties and relevant peer-
reviewed studies.
Accordingly, if a business submitted a
paper to the U.S. EPA regarding research it
had conducted on the risks posed by one of its
products, and the U.S. EPA was going to con-
sider this paper as part of making a decision
involving that family of products—a decision
that would have a substantial impact on pro-
ducers and customers of those products—that
paper would be subject to the most demanding
level of IQA objectivity standards. The under-
lying data and methods would have to be pro-
vided to the agency. Also, the agency (and
hence the submitter) would have to be able to
document that the research reported in the
paper was conducted in accordance with sound
and objective scientiﬁc practices. Finally, the
paper would need to be based on the best avail-
able science, including any peer-reviewed work
in the literature. [Notably, by virtue of being
provided to a federal agency, this information
would become subject to the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA 1966). Exemptions to
FOIA exist for privacy and commercial consid-
erations, although health effects data generally
cannot be claimed as confidential business
information (Conrad 2006).]
Good Laboratory Practice regulations.
Both the U.S. EPA and Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) have adopted compara-
ble sets of requirements specifying laboratory
practices and procedures that must be followed
to ensure the quality and integrity of studies
submitted to support agency decisions (FDA
2006; U.S. EPA 2006a, 2006b). These Good
Laboratory Practice (GLP) standards prescribe
essential, routine features of sound laboratory
science. All studies submitted to these agencies
in connection with the relevant statutory pro-
grams must be conducted in accordance with
these standards. The GLP rules are more rigor-
ous than standards followed at university labo-
ratories (Anderson et al. 2001).
GLPs have three basic elements: quality
assurance, standard operating procedures, and
study protocols.
Quality assurance. GLPs mandate docu-
mentation of study conduct and results and
ensure that a full record of the study is pre-
served for subsequent review, if necessary.
Standard operating procedures. There
must be written procedures for accurate and
full data collection under the nonclinical lab-
oratory study methods to be used, methods
determined by management to be adequate to
ensure the quality and integrity of the data.
Study protocols. Each study must state
the objectives and all methods for the conduct
of the study in a clearly written protocol that
must be approved by the agency. These pro-
tocols have been validated and chosen, after
extensive and careful review, to provide an
acceptable degree of scientiﬁc certainty, in the
agency’s view, regarding the reliability and
relevance of test results, which in turn pro-
vides the confidence necessary for making
safety determinations and other regulatory
determinations.
Conformance to GLPs does not, in itself,
ensure that scientiﬁc work is reproducible, or
that the resulting data will be interpreted cor-
rectly. However, when research studies adhere
to GLPs, reviewers and those acting upon the
science may have a high degree of conﬁdence
that the experimenters a) adhered to the
experimental protocol employed, b) took all
the steps and measurements claimed to be
taken during conduct of the study itself, and
c) accurately reported the test results.
GLPs are neither required nor common in
research laboratories but have been imple-
mented at all U.S. EPA contract laboratories
and at major universities that perform signiﬁ-
cant medical and toxicology testing and
research for regulatory purposes. Sponsoring
organizations can require that research and
testing studies comply with GLPs and can
incorporate that request into contractual vehi-
cles. As a result, GLPs have grown to be used
fairly extensively outside the specific U.S.
EPA and FDA regulatory contexts in which
they are required.
Peer review. While peer review has been an
integral part of medicine for centuries, it has
become a mainstay of the scientific process
only since the mid-twentieth century
(Wikipedia 2007b). The National Research
Council (NRC) has deﬁned peer review as pro-
viding an “in-depth critique of assumptions,
calculations, extrapolations, alternate interpre-
tations, methodology, and acceptance criteria
employed and conclusions drawn in the origi-
nal work” (NRC 1998). At a minimum, peer
review must exhibit the following features
(International Life Sciences Institute 2005):
• It must include multiple assessments.
• It must be conducted by scientists with no
direct connection to the research, or its
sponsors.
• It must be conducted by scientists who have
experience with or expertise in the research
in question.
A rigorous peer review is a key part of the
foundation on which scientific excellence is
achieved in all research programs. Science is
not “self-evident” and requires scientiﬁc judg-
ment, and because judgments vary, a well-
balanced representation of intellectual
perspectives is needed. Where that is obtained,
the peer review is more likely to rebut any sci-
entiﬁcally untoward or untenable hypothesis
and arrive at a successful review.
The crucial role of reviewer independence
and expertise. The hallmark of any peer
review is the independence and expertise of
the peer reviewer. Reviewer knowledge, expe-
rience, and expertise are central requirements
for instructive peer review and ensure “techni-
cal credibility” for the review. The peer
reviewer should have expertise at least equiva-
lent to that needed for the “original work” but
must be independent of the work being
reviewed. These dual requirements for exper-
tise and independence offer the best chance of
obtaining objective, expert evaluation while
maintaining scientiﬁc integrity (NRC 2003).
Conflict of interest and bias in peer
review. Identifying and managing potential
conﬂicts of interest (COIs)—ﬁnancial and non-
financial—is critical to meeting the require-
ment for independent peer review. In turn, this
requires distinguishing between COI and bias.
The National Academies (2003) defines
COI as any financial or other interest that
conflicts with the service of an individual
because it could impair the individual’s objec-
tivity or create an unfair competitive advan-
tage for any individual or organization.
Conventionally speaking, some COIs are
“actual,” with an unambiguous potential for
financial gain (e.g., the reviewer holds stock
in an entity likely to be affected by the rele-
vant regulatory action). Other actual COIs
might be employment conﬂicts or close pro-
fessional financial relationships. Potential
financial COIs may exist on the part of
experts remunerated by any individual or
organization (International Life Sciences
Institute 2005). Similarly, any scientist can
have a COI, depending on the topic. As the
Government Accountability Office (GAO
2001) has noted, association with industry
does not by itself indicate a COI. Conversely,
association with an environmental group does
not inoculate a scientist against COIs. There
well may be COIs among academics, because
of intense competition for research funds and
publications, that are difﬁcult to identify.
An individual with a COI generally may
not participate in a peer review. Organizations
that use peer-review systems require candi-
dates to disclose their organizational affilia-
tions, financial interests, personal and
professional involvement, and other informa-
tion that may be pertinent to the topic, erring
on the side of full disclosure, and to certify
that the information is true and accurate to
the best of their knowledge.
“Bias” is a partiality or loss of objectivity
because of personal views or positions and may
be perceived as arising from the close identiﬁ-
cation or association of an individual with a
particular point of view or with a particular
group that may be affected by the research
being reviewed. For example, questions about
the neutrality of a reviewer could arise if
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at a hearing.
It is generally recognized that bias is
pervasive and not inherently undesirable. A
subcommittee of the U.S. EPA Science
Advisory Board (2000) has opined that,
“[a]lthough it is possible to avoid conﬂict of
interest, avoidance of bias is probably not
possible. All scientists carry bias due, for
example, to discipline, afﬁliation and experi-
ence.” Potential sources of bias in peer review-
ers are managed through disclosure.
Federal regulations generally implement
these concepts. Although these rules address
only federal employees, they include “special
government employees,” such as participants
in panels organized under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (1972), and there-
fore they apply in the case of federal peer
review panels such as the U.S. EPA Science
Advisory Board. These rules prohibit a federal
employee from participating directly and sub-
stantially in a particular matter (as opposed to
“broad policy options”) that will have a direct
and predictable effect on a) a ﬁnancial interest
of the employee (generally, employment or
stock ownership); b) the employee’s employer;
or c) organizations for which the person has
served in the last year in a paid capacity or as
an active participant, where a reasonable per-
son would question the person’s impartiality
in the matter, unless covered by an exclusion
or issued a waiver (Office of Government
Ethics 1997).
Peer review at federal agencies.
Historically, the primary venues for peer
review have been in journal publication and
in grant evaluation. Increasingly, federal agen-
cies have been conducting more demanding
peer reviews of studies that will form the basis
of important agency decisions. For example,
the U.S. EPA has several standing advisory
bodies to conduct peer reviews, including its
Science Advisory Board, its Science Advisory
Panel (for pesticide program decisions), and
its Clean Air Science Advisory Committee.
Some agencies request the National Research
Council of the National Academies to con-
vene peer reviews for very prominent issues
and assessments. Although the principles for
journal and agency peer review are the same,
they involve very different practices, proce-
dures, and decision pathways from the results
and conclusions of the peer review.
Agency peer reviews are complex, time
consuming, and most often involve forming a
panel of expert peer reviewers, where the
panel will meet in public for their delibera-
tions. In some cases, peer reviews are con-
ducted by scientists within the agency, and in
other cases by external scientists. Prior criti-
cisms of agency peer reviews (GAO 2001)
have only heightened the scrutiny applied to
them both within and outside agencies.
OMB’s peer review bulletin. Many fed-
eral agencies have written policies for when
and how to conduct agency peer reviews (U.S.
EPA Science Policy Council 2000). To bring
greater consistency to and establish minimum
requirements for such reviews, the OMB and
the Ofﬁce of Science and Technology Policy
in early 2005 issued their “Final Information
Quality Bulletin for Peer Review” (OMB
2005). The bulletin requires all federal agen-
cies to conduct peer reviews of all “inﬂuential”
scientific information—defined as under the
IQA—that the agency intends to disseminate.
[As with the IQA, information disseminated
as part of an adjudication (e.g., a permit deci-
sion) is exempt from rules outlined in the bul-
letin, unless it is novel or precedential and peer
review is practical.]
The bulletin sets especially high standards
for “highly inﬂuential” scientiﬁc assessments.
For these documents, a) agency scientists gen-
erally may not participate; b) reviewers must be
provided with background information sufﬁ-
cient to understand the key ﬁndings or conclu-
sions of the draft assessment; c) where feasible,
public comment should be sought and pro-
vided to the reviewers; and d) the agency
should respond to the reviewers’ report.
Under the guidelines of the OMB bul-
letin, peer review should now be applied sys-
tematically to all influential scientific
information published by federal agencies or
used by them to make decisions—regardless of
why the work was conducted—in a manner
that is more rigorous and revealing than that
occurring outside the federal government.
Disclosure and acknowledgment of funding
sources. In the mid-1990s, concern arose about
the integrity of scientific research because of
increasing commercial links and consequent
influences. In response, the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the
National Science Foundation (NSF) issued
their “Investigator Financial Disclosure Policy”
(DHHS/NSF 1995). This policy required dis-
closure of an investigator’s signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
interest if it “would reasonably appear to be
affected” by activities funded or proposed for
funding by NSF and DHHS.
As the scientiﬁc community became more
aware of the potential COIs for university
investigators with commercial ties receiving
federal grant support, questions also emerged
about the potential implications for interpreta-
tion of research results and conclusions. By
2001 some of the major scientiﬁc journals had
established policies to encourage authors to
declare any competing financial interests in
relation to research papers. Financial disclo-
sure forms are now routinely required to be
submitted with manuscripts for use by the edi-
tors, and journal articles generally acknowl-
edge research support, although the practice is
not universal (Nature 2006; Science 2006).
Although journals have instituted disclo-
sure policies (sometimes termed “competing
ﬁnancial interests policies”) to increase trans-
parency for their readers, granting agencies
and sponsors employ a variety of approaches
and requirements, and it is too early to con-
clude that a broad consensus practice has been
established. The Long-Range Initiative (LRI)
of the American Chemistry Council (ACC)
requires its contractors to acknowledge ACC
as a sponsor of the research in all articles or
publications pertaining to the research con-
ducted under agreement with the ACC.
Transparent research policies. Research
programs are commonly regarded as more
credible, and their results less suspect, when
they employ transparent processes and proce-
dures regarding ownership of data, release of
results, and publication of results. This prac-
tice is growing for assessing scientiﬁc quality,
although it has not yet achieved broad accep-
tance within the research community.
When investigators own the data and the
scientific information that they generate
through their research efforts, they are in con-
trol of how those data will be evaluated, used,
and communicated. Sponsors who choose to
employ this approach do so to lend strength,
objectivity, and credibility to the outcome of
the research. The ACC LRI program includes
this element of data ownership (ACC 2006).
With ownership of the data—the right to
release data independently and to publish
without prior sponsor approval—inappropri-
ate sponsor interference can be avoided.
Interactions with sponsors can be beneﬁcial in
providing specialized knowledge and insight at
a level of detail other scientiﬁc resources might
not provide. However, the final decision on
whether to accept the sponsor’s information or
advice remains with the investigator.
Congress has required the federal govern-
ment to take a slightly different tack in
the area of research transparency. As a result
of the “Shelby Amendment” (Omnibus
Appropriations Act 1998), the OMB revised its
Circular A-110 governing federal grants, and
now all federal agencies must make available to
the public, pursuant to FOIA, final research
data generated by agency grantees that an
agency cites in support of a rule or order (OMB
1999). Thus, when the federal government
funds scientiﬁc work and relies on it to support
agency action with the force and effect of law,
the data produced by that work will be placed
in the public domain if someone in the public
asks for it. This way, federally funded research
data can be available so that the scientiﬁc com-
munity can validate the work through replica-
tion. Although Circular A-110 does not apply
to privately funded research submitted to fed-
eral agencies, the same prospect of disclosure is
an inevitable effect of the IQA, discussed
above, if the agency relies on that information.
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The foregoing discussion outlines the standards
that one can use to judge the quality of scien-
tiﬁc research without regard to the purpose for
which it was conducted. The following discus-
sion explains why regulatory agencies should
not—and arguably cannot—treat science cre-
ated for purposes of an agency proceeding dif-
ferently in that proceeding than science not
created for purposes of that proceeding.
The breadth of research and testing
obligations. The data proffered by regulated
parties in agency proceedings often are not
solely the results of self-interested efforts to
inﬂuence those proceedings. Rather, in many
cases the parties have been obligated by regu-
lation or order to conduct particular studies,
according to particular protocols, and to pro-
vide the results of that work to the agency
(Conrad 2006).
For example, under Section 4 of the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA 1976), the
U.S. EPA has broad power to issue rules order-
ing persons manufacturing, processing, or
importing a chemical to conduct further tests
regarding the chemical’s health or environmen-
tal effects. TSCA Section 8(d) authorizes the
U.S. EPA to compel, by rule, manufacturers
and importers of a given chemical to submit
lists and copies of existing, unpublished health
and safety studies for the chemical. TSCA
mandates have resulted in “more than 50,000
studies covering a broad range of health and
ecological endpoints” being ﬁled with the U.S.
EPA since 1976 (U.S. EPA 2003a).
Similarly, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (1972)
requires any potential pesticide chemical to
undergo more than 100 scientific tests
addressing chemistry, health effects, environ-
mental effects, and residue chemistry to deter-
mine whether it can be used safely (U.S. EPA
2006c). Only after the information has
undergone a thorough and rigorous review by
the U.S. EPA can the product be “registered”
by the U.S. EPA for use to protect crops or
public health.
Most federal processes for evaluating the
safety of chemicals, including the FDA review
of drug applications (Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act 1938), depend heavily on pri-
vately generated data. Indeed, historically and
for the foreseeable future, the vast majority of
chemical and product testing has been and will
be borne by industry, not the public sector.
Policies regarding the treatment of the result-
ing data need to bear this reality in mind.
The rights of interested persons under
federal administrative law. The notion that
science generated for regulatory purposes
should be evaluated differently than other
science is premised on the idea that the self-
interest of regulated parties that conduct or
sponsor research creates a conflict with the
interest of the truth, whether conscious or
unconscious, that renders the research invalid
or at least suspect (Krimsky 2005).
At the outset, we acknowledge the grow-
ing literature purporting to ﬁnd that industry-
funded research produces results that favor its
sponsors more often than other research on
the same topic (Krimsky 2005; vom Saal and
Hughes 2005). As the authors of one of those
studies has fairly observed in comparing
industry and government-funded studies, one
or both of two things could be going on:
either “industry-funded scientists [are] under
real or perceived pressure to ﬁnd and publish
only data suggesting negative outcomes” or
“government-funded scientists [are] under
real or perceived pressure to publish only data
suggesting adverse outcomes” (vom Saal and
Hughes 2005). Indeed, the source of a scien-
tist’s funding may be less a cause of bias than
an effect of it. As an editor of The Lancet
(Horton 1997) has argued, ﬁnancial conﬂicts
“may not be [more] inﬂuential” than underly-
ing biases, because “interpretations of scien-
tiﬁc data will always be refracted through the
experiences and biases of the authors.”
Similarly, a student of the science/policy
interface (Sarewitz 2004) has argued that
stripping out conflicts of interest and ideological
commitments to look at ‘what the science is really
telling us’ can be a meaningless exercise [because]
even the most apparently apolitical, disinterested
scientist may, by virtue of disciplinary orientation,
view the world in a way that is more amenable to
some value systems than others.
As vom Saal and Hughes argued in their arti-
cle (2005), the appropriate technical response
when confronted with science conducted by
interested parties is to use that fact as an alert
to look, perhaps more deeply than one other-
wise might have, for “what specific factors,
other than source of funding,” may be associ-
ated with the results of that science.
Such an approach is clearly the only
proper one in the case of interested research
submitted to federal regulatory agencies, sim-
ply because the concept of “conﬂict of inter-
est” is not employed in federal laws governing
the regulatory process (aside from the govern-
ment ethics rules noted above). Indeed, no
federal laws, rules, or policies express a pre-
sumption that agencies in a given proceeding
should ignore or give less weight to scientiﬁc
work on the basis of who conducted or
funded it or, more to the point, whether it
was prepared speciﬁcally for the relevant pro-
ceeding. To the contrary, federal administra-
tive law, as interpreted by the courts,
generally evinces a congressional mandate that
agencies give interested or affected parties
access to and input into administrative
processes. In effect, Congress and the courts
have determined that in an open democratic
society administered by a bureaucracy
required to act fairly and rationally, it is
important that agencies allow interested or
affected persons to provide information to
them, and fairly consider that information.
The backbone of federal administrative
law is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA
1946), which requires agencies to provide
notice and “give interested persons an oppor-
tunity to participate in [a] rulemaking
through the submission of written data,
views, or arguments. . . .” Courts interpreting
Section 553 of the APA have made clear that
an agency must consider and respond to—
rather than discount—all significant matters
put before it. In particular, courts have specif-
ically rejected the notion that the APA should
provide some basis for insulating agency ofﬁ-
cials from the input of regulated parties. In
the words of former D.C. Circuit Judge
Patricia Wald (Sierra Club v. Costle 1981):
Under our system of government, the very legiti-
macy of general policymaking performed by
unelected administrators depends in no small part
upon the openness, accessibility, and amenability
of these officials to the needs of the public from
which their ultimate authority derives, and upon
whom their commands must fall. . . . Furthermore,
the importance to effective regulation of continu-
ing contact with a regulated industry, other
affected groups, and the public cannot be underes-
timated. Informal contacts can . . . spur the provi-
sion of information which the agency needs.
In addition to setting a single set of quality
standards for federally disseminated informa-
tion regardless of provenance, the IQA also
authorizes “affected persons to seek and obtain
correction of information . . . disseminated by
[a federal] agency that does not comply with
the guidelines issued by [OMB].” Far from
having their own information judged weighted
less under the IQA, affected persons are
empowered to use their own information to
obtain correction of government information
that does not meet the common set of
standards that should apply to any information
disseminated by the government.
Several other administrative law statutes
embody the same orientation toward inter-
ested persons and their rights to submit infor-
mation to federal agencies and have it
considered. These include the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (1980), the Paperwork
Reduction Act (1980), and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (1972). The latter
also requires advisory committees to be “bal-
anced,” which should equally prohibit exclu-
sion of, as well as domination by, any interest.
The upshot of this authority is not that
regulated agencies are bound to accept
unquestioningly any information that is gen-
erated specifically for that proceeding.
Agencies can and, indeed, must assess the
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But they cannot adopt blanket approaches
that judge science generated for a regulatory
proceeding differently than other science con-
sidered in that proceeding.
What sorts of proceedings and entities
would be covered. The next hurdle in imagin-
ing a system that imposed different standards
on science created speciﬁcally for a given reg-
ulatory proceeding is to consider what sorts of
agency “proceedings,” and what sorts of enti-
ties conducting or sponsoring science, would
be covered. These turn out not to be simple
determinations in all cases.
Where testing is being conducted by a
manufacturer of a chemical or product
(e.g., an exposure study conducted in support
of a pesticide’s reregistration), there is little
question that the research is being conducted
for those proceedings. But manufacturers
frequently conduct or sponsor research and
testing for product stewardship and other
business reasons. In some cases, that work may
also be useful in some other agency “proceed-
ing” (e.g., establishing a “reference concentra-
tion” value in the U.S. EPA Integrated Risk
Information System database (http://www.
epa.gov/iris). Such a proceeding may be ongo-
ing, or the company may know the agency is
contemplating it, or the company may plan to
propose that the agency initiate it. What
would the rules be in such “mixed-motive”
cases? Conversely, such an agency proceeding
may arise later and be truly unanticipated by
the regulated entity. What sort of evidentiary
process would have to be established to deter-
mine what the research proponent intended or
knew at the time research was initiated? All
these circumstances would need to be
addressed in a system that tried to treat “regu-
latory proceeding” science differently.
Moreover, many regulatory settings are
more than bilateral; that is, entities other than
the agency and a single regulated party may
be able to submit scientiﬁc information. Even
if one accepted the premise that science pre-
pared for purposes of a proceeding should be
treated differently than other science, there is
no inherent reason that science prepared for a
proceeding by opponents of the permit
should be treated differently than science pre-
pared by its proponents. Indeed, many regu-
latory proceedings have multiple parties
aligned with and against the agency and other
parties on different issues in complex ways,
making it difﬁcult in many cases to determine
who is on anyone’s “side.”
Finally, it will often be difﬁcult to demar-
cate “nonregulatory” science, given the extent
to which academic scientists are participants
or are at least partisans in regulatory disputes.
Although highly controversial issues generally
raise important intellectual questions (e.g.,
the effects of pollutants at low doses), there is
also no question that many of the academics
working on these issues are highly invested
both in their hypotheses and in the regulatory
uses of their findings. Although these scien-
tists may not have a ﬁnancial or other tangible
stake in any particular regulatory proceeding,
it seems artificial and formalistic to say that
their research is not being conducted, at least
in part, so that its results can be used in
regulatory proceedings.
Thus, any effort to establish special rules
for consideration of science generated for
regulatory proceedings will face difﬁcult deﬁn-
itional challenges regarding what is a “pro-
ceeding,” even more difficult evidentiary
challenges determining whether and the extent
to which scientiﬁc work was being conducted
for such proceedings, and politically loaded
challenges over when “unafﬁliated” or “acade-
mic” work was in fact being conducted, at
least in part, for regulatory purposes.
Case study: the U.S. EPA assessment fac-
tors for external information. The issues
raised above ultimately led the U.S. EPA to
abandon a related effort: to establish guide-
lines that treated “external” information dif-
ferently than information whose generation
the U.S. EPA controlled.
Early on, the U.S. EPA realized that the
IQA would apply to information generated
by third parties that the agency relied upon or
otherwise disseminated. The U.S. EPA draft
“Assessment Factors for Evaluating the
Quality of Information from External
Sources” (U.S. EPA 2002b) noted that
the Agency . . . receives information that is volun-
tarily submitted to EPA by external sources (‘third
parties’) in hopes of inﬂuencing Agency actions....
The purpose of this document is to describe sets of
‘assessment factors’ that illustrate the types of con-
siderations that EPA takes into account when evalu-
ating the quality and relevance of information that
is voluntarily submitted or that we obtain from
external sources in support of various Agency
actions.
The balance of the document consisted of an
elaboration on five “categories of general
assessment factors”: soundness, applicability
and utility, clarity and completeness, uncer-
tainty and variability, and evaluation and
review.
Critics argued that there is no basis, under
the IQA or any other legal authority, or
indeed, on any technical grounds, for the
U.S. EPA to assess “external” or “third-party”
information by different standards than ﬁrst-
or second-party information. On technical
grounds, critics noted that information gener-
ated by the U.S. EPA or its contractors is not
immune from the same types of errors associ-
ated with information from external sources.
For example, the U.S. EPA Inspector General
had just issued a memorandum noting that
the agency faced a number of unresolved
challenges in “establishing quality assurance
practices to improve the reliability, accuracy,
and scientific basis of environmental data”
(U.S. EPA Inspector General 2002). The
Inspector General’s memo expressed similar
concerns with respect to the accuracy and reli-
ability of information generated by U.S. EPA
contractors. Critics argued that there was
ample justiﬁcation for the agency to apply its
proposed assessment factors to that informa-
tion, as well as to information submitted by
third parties.
Critics of the U.S. EPA draft assessment
factors also argued that assessment factors for
external information created the undesirable
appearance of a double standard and opened
the door to arbitrary agency decisions to
exclude otherwise appropriate information
received from external sources on the basis of
the selective application of assessment factors
to information products. Most important,
they contended that the standards the agency
offered for judging the quality and reliability
of third-party data were no different than
those that should be applied to evaluate infor-
mation generated by the agency itself, U.S.
EPA contractors, or U.S. EPA permittees, and
hence a single set of assessment factors should
apply to all.
When the U.S. EPA finalized the assess-
ment factors document, it clariﬁed that “the
document does not constitute a new standard
for information quality, nor does it describe a
new process for evaluating third party infor-
mation.” Second, and more important, it
added that, “in general, we agree that consis-
tent standards of quality should apply to both
internally and externally generated informa-
tion, when used for the same purposes” (U.S.
EPA 2003b).
Conclusion
Only one set of standards and practices
should be used to judge the quality of scien-
tific work in a given regulatory proceeding,
regardless of why the work was conducted. It
may be that, over time, more of these prac-
tices and standards will apply to all scientiﬁc
information. Many of these hallmarks of sci-
entific quality are incorporated into federal
law, rules, and policy. These same federal
authorities impose additional standards that
further ensure the quality of scientific work
generated or submitted for regulatory pur-
poses. Federal laws also ensure that interested
parties have a right to submit information for
regulatory proceedings and to have that infor-
mation considered fairly and on its merits.
Any system of differential treatment for regu-
latory science would face severe scrutiny in
light of that authority and would be difﬁcult
to administer. Most important, it would not
necessarily lead to an improved scientific
foundation for regulations.
Henry and Conrad
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